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Castellucci’s Theatre of the ‘Abject/Sublime’: or, the Theatre of Failed 
Transcendence 
 
 
 
 
 
Castellucci’s On the Concept of the Face, Regarding the Son of God presents its audience 
with two startling yet – at least in terms of their respective symbolic systems – 
incongruous images; an incongruity that derives, no doubt, from a certain iconoclasm, 
and therefore from a certain mischievousness.  On the one hand, one finds the stage 
overwhelmed by an image of Christ that gestures towards what might be called the 
‘Christian Sublime’ – a sublime that in its mystical form will further point to the ineffable 
power contained in the idea of the transcendence of God, and before which one finds, 
dwarfed on the stage, the puny figures of two men, who in all their powerlessness suffer 
and bear the absolute vertigo of humankind confronted by an excessive and unbearable 
infinite.  What this image invokes is the idea that redemption from fallenness, attained 
through suffering, is contained in the Christian sublime through the mystery of God’s 
grace; and yet already one senses, art’s capacity for allusion which claims peculiar 
access via the use of figurative form to religious transcendence, is shown at best to be an 
ambiguous power on the theatrical stage, in so far as is shown to be theatrical.   
A second image troubles the presupposed authority of that sublime ideality of God 
in a manner that brings to mind the Gnostic tradition, with its fascination for base 
matter – not through figuration but in a turn to the violence wrought by thingly 
abstraction.  Lyotard’s pronouncement that in order to present the unpresentable ‘you 
have to make presentation suffer’ comes to mind (Lyotard 1993: 125.) Thus we are 
confronted with a vast, bleeding ‘stigmata’ that finally obliterates the first image, and in 
so doing exposes what the stage hides, and has always hidden in plain sight behind its 
representations. What one finds on Castellucci’s stage destroys whatever idealism may 
lurk in theatrical symbolism: it is the presence of those bodies that must ultimately bear 
the expectations of the stage – and that attest to an intransigent materiality, in the same 
way that a stigmata, which can only be borne by tissue and skin, by flesh and blood, 
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vessels and sinews, reveals the numinous reality of the body to the person who endures 
it.  In a short essay on Gnosticism, Georges Bataille would write:  
 
Base matter is external and foreign to ideal human aspirations, and it refuses to 
allow itself to be reduced to the great ontological machines resulting from these 
aspirations.  But the psychological process brought to light by Gnosticism had the 
same impact: it was a question of disconcerting the human spirit and idealism 
before something base, to the extent that one recognised the helplessness of 
superior principles (Bataille 1996: 51).   
 
If what one finds here is not helplessness per se, but the helplessness of superior 
principles, it is because what Castellucci confronts us with will be, precisely put, ‘human 
all too human’.  This ‘helplessness’, however, will also help disclose the depth of theatre’s 
ontological failure – or perhaps the failure of a certain ontology that once provided 
theatrical representation with a ground and a sure footing. It is the failure of the power 
invested in theatre to indicate a privileged signified that incessantly pulls the theatrical 
image away from its representative function, back towards the body, and – on 
Castellucci’s stage, at least, towards a demonstration of human abjection and suffering.  
What I would like to suggest here (since we are quite literally caught in the 
temporal differential that correlates these two event-images, in which what is revealed, 
finally, will be the abject space of theatre itself) are two things.  Firstly, what opens 
before these two images will be a theatrical space in which a certain minimal action will 
unfold and which, if it is not exactly inappropriate or improper, will nonetheless provoke 
a profound unease amongst its auditors – not however because they are assailed by the 
sight and stench of the theatrical shit, which drifts through the auditorium, but rather, 
and despite this nauseating spectacle, because it describes an action – in other words, 
because it stages the problem of the ‘ethical’.  Secondly what one encounters through its 
overt manipulation of the audience’s sensory faculties – the vivid use of noise, for 
instance, and in its spectacle and use of smell – will be the image of theatre itself as a 
site of abjection in which ‘theatricality’ is not simply exposed but exposed to the fault line 
of the abject/sublime.  So, between the plasticity of representation, the base materiality 
of theatrical form, the affective power of matter and the passivity of the soma, in which 
theatre’s idealism will be confounded and disturbed, what Castellucci stages, I shall 
argue, is nothing less than a theatre in which theatre’s own claims to transcendence are 
played back to it as ‘disaster’ – a disaster that arises as a consequence of the failure of 
theatre’s representative function; a disaster, therefore, that points to the extreme ethical 
crisis that assails the stage in post-industrial capitalist societies. 
No doubt it will already be understood that this attempt to make sense of theatre’s 
relation to the abject/sublime recalls the work of Julia Kristeva; and, indeed, we will 
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need to grasp the theatre, its problematic forms of representation, and the crisis of its 
transcendence in light of Kristeva’s dictum that the ‘abject is edged with the sublime’.  
Nevertheless, this crisis of representation is exemplified in relation to the ‘concept’ of the 
face; and one can already perhaps understand something of the nature of the crisis of 
representation, which will assail the image of Christ on Castellucci’s stage, if we consider 
Levinas’ claim that the face is nothing less than the ‘infinite which blinks’ (Levinas 
2002a: 93).  The face in the Judaic tradition, we should recall, exceeds all powers of 
human designation and art; it will provoke Kant to write, in the third critique: ‘Perhaps 
there is no more sublime passage in the Jewish Law than the commandment: Thou shalt 
not make unto thee any graven image’ (Kant 1952: 127) – the analogy for Kant being that 
the sublime, like the face of God, evades depiction, and evades it in an absolute sense – 
as the very law of its being. What results from this ethical crisis of representation, and 
what is proposed here, then, is a theatre of ‘failed transcendence’, as I shall call it, in 
which Castellucci’s ‘face’ of God, returned to the abject condition of its own corporeality – 
the concrete, fleshy, disturbing and abject materiality of the human face – marks the 
traumatic site of the ethical demand. 
 
SEVERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE ABJECT/SUBLIME 
 
First question: What is more sublime - the incarnated or the ineffable face of God?   
This seems to be at least one of the many questions one could pose in relation to 
Castellucci’s On the Concept of the Face… – a performance that describes the relationship 
between an incontinent old man and the son who cares for him.  It is a performance that 
takes place, as we have said, against a backdrop bearing the colossal and iconic image of 
Christ’s face, taken from Antonello da Messina’s painting Salvator Mundi, the Saviour of 
the World. Castellucci’s show has its own way of responding to this question, and in so 
doing forces us to confront the deeper question of what sublimity means for us today in 
theatre, as well as, perhaps, serving to direct our attention to the vexed relation between 
the theatre and the experience of the sacred.  
But let us begin by dwelling for a moment on the face of Christ who watches over 
both the action on the stage and over the audience.  His expression although open and 
sincere is nevertheless not easy to decipher.  If it is not quite impassive, it is certainly 
inscrutable and unfathomable.  What is he thinking?  What does he feel?  Is it pity or 
sorrow or bliss at the thought of our salvation?  What does he want from us?  What does 
he want for us?  It is impossible for us to say.  It is because the expression is inscrutable, 
unreadable, and disturbingly enigmatic that it confers upon the viewer the sense that 
there is a power at work within it that captures something of the ‘sublime’ – that is, 
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something boundless and in excess of our cognitive capacities.  If it is hard to say why 
the expression chosen by the painter, which to be sure is undoubtedly empathetic, is so 
fitting, and why the feeling it produces is not quite resolvable into the pleasurable form of 
the ‘beautiful’, or the reassuring consensus that founds a community of taste, we can 
perhaps at least say that the comportment of the man whose face it is escapes any fixed 
location within the space of the mundane.  Subjecting the spectator to an infinite gaze, 
he both sees us, and looks beyond us.  In fact, to the extent that it holds us captive to 
this gaze, one might say that in Messina’s portrait of Christ, here we find a face that 
resolutely refuses to blink.  Thus the image of the son of god does not refer its viewer 
back to man, or to the world stage, or to an existence bound by the mortal or morbid 
corruptions of the flesh – the ‘ills to which the body is heir’.  It refers man to what 
surpasses bounded existence: the infinite and unseen countenance of God and the 
ineffable ‘mysterium’ of an absolute, omnipotent and transcendent authority.  And yet, is 
it not the case that the power of Messina’s portrait of Christ in fact rests upon a 
paradox?  It lies in the way we are referred to that which exceeds all human capacities of 
signification, and to an absolute that no image could contain.  Nonetheless, at the same 
time, one is confronted with the imperfect face of a man.  It is here that the icon hovers 
miraculously over the abyss of representational form, conjuring all the powers of art to 
defy the effects of gravity.  The binding of God to the materiality of the flesh and to the 
finite particularity of the body cannot but assail Messina’s attempt to represent Christ as 
a mere man, invoking the paradox of how an absolute and universal being could come to 
be expressed in a form with which it is incommensurable and with which it shares no 
common measure.  Messina’s icon, then, whose empathetic effect derives from its 
remarkable realism, and from the attempt to depict Christ as a ‘psychological’ being, will 
unknowingly insinuate into the doctrine of the incarnation the impossibility that already 
lies at the heart of representation and which was implicitly understood in the Judaic 
prohibition against the idolatrous act of presenting the countenance that even Moses was 
not allowed to see.  This is why the problem of the incarnation cannot evade the problem 
of representation, and why the latter at least, which claims to stand in a relation of 
transparency to the thing ‘represented’ will in time capitulate to the contradiction 
inherent in the opaque matter of representation – an opacity that renders representation 
and its rationality ultimately inscrutable.   
If this paradox, which assails the image of Christian transcendence, in Messina’s 
portrait of Christ, nevertheless provides a means for opening up the possibility of the 
experience of the abject/sublime – it is precisely because it touches upon the essential 
ambiguity inherent within representational form into which the face of Christ threatens 
to collapse.  Hovering between legibility and illegibility; transcendence and immanence; 
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recognition and misidentification, it is the face that disturbs us precisely because it 
reveals something inaccessible.  The cause of this disturbance and turmoil is not just 
attributable to the fact that, as Levinas says at one point, ‘in the image, thought reaches 
the face of the other reduced to its plastic forms’ (Levinas 1999: 123) but also, and more 
disturbingly, it is because it reveals that the face is, above all else, an image, a 
resemblance of itself, embodied in a plasticity that confronts thought with a density it 
cannot fully penetrate, comprehend or grasp.  Greater, therefore, than those yawning 
precipices, where solitary travellers measure themselves up to the abyss, or those rising 
pyramids, so beloved of orientalist painters, that seem to hold sway over the infinite 
magnitude of the desert, or the ravaged seascape, in Gericault, which imperils the lives of 
a few shipwrecked survivors, clinging piteously to a raft that is already breaking apart, or 
the ‘vast scale’, as Kant puts it, of nature’s might (Kant 1952: 115), here, on Castellucci’s 
stage, it is the depiction of nothing more than the face of a man that makes present the 
impossible object of the sublime.   
 
A preliminary observation on the sublime: to traditional aesthetics, the sublime refers to 
any object which excites or causes profound and disturbing feelings or sensations.  
Burke associated it with ‘astonishment’ – the ‘state of the soul, in which all its motions 
are suspended, with some degree of horror’ (Burke 2008: 53).  According to Kant, 
however, its proper element is associated with the noumenal realm, by which he meant 
the realm of suprasensible being, inexperienceable by the empirical faculties, and thus 
inexplicable in terms of inductive reasoning.  But insofar as the sublime takes the 
phenomenal form of a ‘feeling’, it also gives rise to the thought, again essentially Kantian, 
that sublimity, the ‘absolutely great’, is to be found ‘only in the proper estate of the 
subject’ (Kant 1952: 121) – in man himself, although not man understood in terms of the 
‘sphere of empirical psychology’ (1952: 117).  What follows from this thought requires 
careful consideration.   
The sublime can no longer be ascribed to an object considered as something ‘real’.  
It is rather a mental event in which the subject believing it has encountered such an 
object is able nevertheless to secure, through grasping its own subjective finality, a 
passage of transcendence, from sublime affect, to its origin in the autonomy of reason.  
Where, then, is the object of the sublime to be located?  Obviously, not in the sensible 
form of a phenomenal datum; as perverse as it may seem, the ‘broad ocean agitated by 
the storm cannot be called sublime’ (1952: 92) for the sublime exceeds, by definition, the 
faculty of sensibility and thus objectification.  That which is immediately intuited does 
not provide the motive according to which the source of the sublime affect is to be 
located and described, determined and verified.  In the sublime, says Kant, the ‘mind has 
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been incited to abandon sensibility’ (1952: 92).  The feeling of the sublime is not 
produced by nature at all but by the work of the imagination which, as Kant says, ‘by its 
own act’ deprives itself of its own freedom.  In the sublime, the subject’s freedom appears 
in the negative form of subjection to an object for which it is essentially responsible. But 
in the moment of sublime affect: ‘the ground of this [freedom] is concealed from [the 
subject], and in its place it feels the sacrifice or deprivation, as well as its cause, to which 
it is subjected’ (1952: 120). This is why, to truly understand the sublime phenomenon, 
we must displace the subject’s fixation with the object to reveal the very ground of 
freedom in which sublime feeling originates.  Here it is a matter of ‘setting before our 
eyes the sublimity of our nature (in its vocation) while at the same time showing us the 
lack of accord of our conduct with respect to it’ (Kant 2001: 74).  Only by realising its 
true vocation, which is one of freedom, does the word ‘subjection’ take on, for the 
subject, an authentically sublime quality. In so doing, it immediately displaces the series 
of affects that are usually associated with the phenomenon of the sublime: horror, fear, 
terror, melancholy, etc., – in fact, what we might call Kant’s radical sublime, is 
discovered at the cost of downgrading such sublime affects to mere theatrical effects. 
There is only one feeling that Kant is willing to credit with genuine sublimity: that of 
‘respect’ or ‘reverence’.  This is because only respect can claim to have a ground not 
based on empirical stimuli, as Kant expresses it, in his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of 
Morals:  
 
reverence… should function as an inflexible precept for the will; and it is just this 
freedom from dependence on interested motives which constitutes the sublimity of 
the maxim and the worthiness of every rational subject to be a law-making 
member of the kingdom of ends (Kant 1995: 100).   
 
The form of subjection, then, which commands respect is subjection of the subject to its 
own law; that is, subjection to the only law through which the subject can, at one and 
the same time, learn the true dignity of obedience and (without succumbing to logical 
absurdity) assert its freedom. 
Nevertheless, we should take note of the discrepancy marked by Kant, above, 
between the sublimity of our vocation for freedom and our actual distance from freedom’s 
reality, our lack of accord with it. For the subject to be able to achieve its freedom, it 
must transcend the pathological domain of sensuous interests: it must oppose itself to 
all worldly desire.  The subject thus finds itself inscribed within a dimension that is 
purely negative.  Just as in the sublime, which, as Kant says, ‘can never be more than a 
negative presentation’ (Kant 1952: 127), so the problem for the subject, in Kantian 
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ethics, is that its own freedom must also be defined negatively, in terms of the will’s 
‘independence of coercion [from] sensuous impulses’ (Kant 1929: 465).  And yet, in 
defining freedom as negative, Kant condemns the subject – at least if it is to exist – to the 
very thing that its autonomy was meant to master. The reason is as simple as it is stark: 
having been elevated to the empty dimension of pure negativity, the subject has no other 
place to go but to fall back into the world.  Hence the project of the radical sublime in 
Kant founders on the rock created for it by the attempt to wager the subject’s freedom on 
the overcoming of its passions or – to put it differently – on the postulate of a 
suprasensible law that in so far as it seeks to inhibit our actions through the mediation 
of what, in Kant, must be construed as improper feelings such as shame, 
embarrassment, and humiliation, cannot guarantee that such states of abjection will be 
sublimated into the higher dignity of respect.  There is no obvious passage available 
within transcendental philosophy that leads from an ignoble sense of shame to the 
‘nobility’ of respect. 
 
 
 
Second question: what could be more abject than the torment of an old man, ravaged by 
Alzheimer’s, as he smears his own shit across his face?   
This second question should also be posed in relation to On the Concept of the 
Face....  The performance is not without its affective power – and quite literally so: the 
auditorium reeks of the stench of defecation, as the son cleans the excrement from his 
father’s backside.   But it also presents us with a powerful and moving depiction of care, 
solicitude and responsibility.  Isn’t this a theatre that precisely employs the mediation of 
negative feelings such as shame, embarrassment, and humiliation, in short, states of 
abjection, so as to sublimate them – through the power of performance - into the higher 
dignity of the feeling of respect?  To be sure, the image of a son patiently and diligently 
washing the faeces from his father’s weak and infirm body would appear to constitute the 
very epitome of duty and ethical obligation, placing us therefore firmly within the 
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gravitational field of Kant’s ethical universe.  But it would be strange to say that the son 
performs his duties out of respect for the moral law, rather than, more simply, and 
straightforwardly, out of respect for his father.  Therefore it would be more prudent, or at 
least, more challenging, to consider the question in light of Castellucci’s juxtaposition of 
sublime icon, with its infinite gaze, and the scene of abjection which confronts us on the 
stage; after all, if Castellucci’s theatre hereby invokes the precepts of Kantian ethics, 
might it not do so only so as to more firmly interrogate that space of anomie – of 
lawlessness – left open by the failure of the project of [Kantian] transcendence?  Seen in 
this way, it seems to present a twofold dilemma that grips the stage just as strongly as 
the stench that induces the audience to recoil from it, gagging.  Firstly, it presents us 
with the crisis of transcendent authority that stems, at least in part, from Kantianism; it 
is the question of how one might exist in a world knowing that – to occupy the very place 
of man - is to face the abandonment of the world by God.  The second impasse stems 
from the crisis of Kantianism itself: how to ground an ethics, knowing that the subject 
occupies the site left vacated by the failure of the philosophy of transcendence: the 
question, in short, of how to ground an ethics, not in the autonomy of the subject, but in 
light of the experience of abjection. 
 
Second observation – on the abject/sublime: It is as if Castellucci’s theatre sought to 
traverse the very edge, the perimeter, the borderline, described by Julia Kristeva, wherein 
the sublime and the abject separate and differentiate themselves.  To be sure, Kristeva 
marked this point of differentiation with terms borrowed from Freud, those of the 
‘symptom’ and ‘sublimation’: ‘In the symptom,’ Kristeva wrote, ‘the abject permeates me, 
I become abject.  Through sublimation, I keep it under control’ (Kristeva 1982: 11).  She 
thereby inevitably reduced the phenomenon of abjection to the indices of 
psychopathology, with its phobias, obsessive behaviours, and perversions.  But the 
abject is also conjured non-theoretically through a phenomenology that discloses the 
ambiguity at the heart of subjectivity, which in order to assert its autonomy associates 
alterity – that which is radically other to the subject - with the sign of what must be 
shunned and excluded, even as it constantly recurs.  It is as though abjection were the 
very condition of the subject’s existence: ‘from its place of banishment’, says Kristeva, 
‘the abject does not cease challenging its master’ (1982: 2).  The strange draw of the 
abject, the ‘radically excluded’, shares this in common with the sublime: it ‘draws me to 
the place where meaning collapses’ (1982: 2).  
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Hence sight of the father’s destitute body provokes the involuntary reflexes of self-
preservation within the audience: confronted by his self-defilement, one recoils from the 
image; one seeks to expurgate the taint of its sickness-unto-death; one refuses to 
countenance its wretched infantilism.  Incontinence discloses, with an uncomfortable 
immediacy, the sheer affective power and horror of the abject.  Now, in contrast to the 
Kantian sublime, it is the abject that gives back to the realm of dispossessed things their 
power to disturb the subject.  And yet it would seem to me to be a mistake to simply 
associate the abject with the impure, corrupt, decaying, or polluted body, and its 
excretions; or with what one finds vile, repulsive and disgusting.  For the work’s affective 
power is all the more profound for being associated with a peculiar phenomenon that we 
must now endeavour to bring to light.  If the condition of the father is abject, it is not just 
because of his infirmity, which threatens to deprive him of his subjectivity.  Nor is the 
primordial horror provoked in the audience by the thought of the loss of sphincteral 
control simply reducible to the threatening loss of the ‘I’ – and still less are we held in 
thrall by mere morbid curiosity.  What compels us to watch is the demand that abjection 
must not be evaded but rather confronted; it is a demand provoked by the sight of the 
father’s anguished face.  It is the face that turns abjection into the very image of human 
suffering, and through it, opens up the dimension of the ethical. 
We are inevitably drawn here to Levinas’ remark in Otherwise than Being: ‘The 
disclosing of a face is nudity, nonform, abandon of self, ageing, dying, more naked than 
nudity.  It is poverty, skin and wrinkles, which are a trace of itself’ (Levinas 2002a: 88).  
We might say: the face is itself a source of abjection but it is not itself abject.  If it 
appears to be abject, it is because it is uncanny.  The Levinasian face ‘escapes 
representation; it is the very collapse of phenomenality’ (2002a: 88). It may seem strange 
to assert that the face collapses phenomenality, given that it appears; but if one recalls 
that it is not a mere object in the world, then one begins to understand something of 
what Levinas intended us to see, which is that the face, unlike an object in the world, 
announces, through its corporeality, an otherness that is inassimilable to knowledge and 
understanding.  It is closer to an event that reaches from beyond the solicitudes and 
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familiarities of my being to bring me before the unfathomable presence of the other, and 
of a temporality that is not my own. Thus even as it repulses me; it calls me toward it.  It 
commands me to respond.  It places me in its debt.  Through its nakedness, the face is 
the pure openness of an unconditional appeal; and the shame it induces is mine alone.  
The abjection, then, is the abjection of the subject before the face of the other; the face 
which, as Levinas says, in emphatically hyperbolic terms, holds the subject ‘hostage’.  
The face of the other ab-jects the subject, destabilises it in its ipseity, in so far as it 
refuses to be assimilated into the domain of identity: ‘I am’, says Levinas, ‘ordered from 
the outside, traumatically commanded, without interiorizing by representation and 
concepts the authority that commands me’ (2002a: 87). If Levinas speaks here of 
transcendence in relation to the face, it is not the kind of transcendence associated with 
the power of the will that seeks, through self-legislation, to master itself.  It is 
transcendence achieved without the passage of sublimity that places me before my own 
excellence.  It is achieved through the ‘pathology’ of the subject’s obsession with what is 
other to it.   
Yet in responding to the demand of the other’s face, in becoming abject before it, 
might this not risk losing the subject to the condition of abjection?   
In Levinas one finds the opposite to be the case: for transcendence is simply 
exposure to the ethical; and it is the ethical that brings the subject to itself in the form of 
a responsibility that is its alone: ‘transcendence is the transcendence of an I. Only an I 
can respond to the injunction of a face’ (Levinas 2002b: 305).  By contrast, we might 
argue: the failure to accomplish such transcendence is abhorrence in the face of the 
abject; yet in retreating into the immanence of subjectivity, in the moment of recoil, the 
subject, paradoxically, loses the good and abandons itself all the more firmly to abjection 
– that is to say, it fails to transcend the abject as condition. 
 
A third and final question: what does the theatre of the ‘abject/sublime’ mean, not just 
for our understanding of Castellucci’s vision of the theatre, but in terms of theatre’s 
relation to its own institution? 
Let us try to understand this question as an attempt to locate the problem of 
theatrical representation, always at play in Castellucci’s work, in terms of theatre’s 
relation to our current epochal crisis (an ethico-political crisis).  It therefore requires that 
we shift perspective, and radically so – away from an attempt to interpret the content of 
the work to the question of how this theatre constitutes itself in relation to this crisis, 
and specifically, in terms that would seem to exploit, through the very mechanism of 
theatre, the injunction of the Judaic Law, which Kant was to cite so approvingly in the 
third critique, against the act of representing the face.   
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Further observation: to look at Antonello da Messina’s painting is to understand the 
subtle and yet decisive transformation that Castellucci’s use of the image brings about, 
in so far as it exposes its iconography to the power of the abject.   
 
 
 
In blowing it up, it is precisely the face that Castellucci cuts out of the painting – not by 
removing it, however, but on the contrary, through the act of isolating it from its 
symbolic framework.  This cut immediately destabilises the face – and precisely by 
removing the theatrical gesture, which grounds its meaning: the hands of Christ, the one 
that rests on the table, subtly directing us to the little prop - the cartellino, the piece of 
parchment bearing an inscription, indicating the theatrics of the trompe l'œil form of 
representation; and the other, the hand that forms the benedictory sign, which indicates 
its function as a devotional image.  The effect is to press the face to the point at which its 
phenomenality indeed seems to hover on the brink of a collapse; and where the image 
itself seems to give way to the violence of abstraction.  Deprived of the apparatus of the 
symbolic order of representation – its expression no longer possesses the power of 
signification; the face seems to suggest the dispersal of its elements … and becomes 
anonymised… are we not led to ask: who’s face is this? 
This anonymity, which is of the essence of the face, should, I think, trouble us.  If 
as Levinas says, the face contains within it, the biblical injunction ‘Thou Shalt not Kill’ 
but must ‘Love thy Neighbour’ – is it not also the case that the face, and not just the 
unrecognisable face of the stranger, but precisely the faces of our neighbours with whom 
we are most familiar, have the power to inspire us to violent, even murderous passions – 
those of hatred and fear?1  This will be the kind of criticism levelled at Levinas by Zizek, 
who accuses Levinas of an ‘ethical prettification’ of the other that fails to take account of 
the radical ‘Otherness of a human being reduced to inhumanity’ (Zizek 2009: 165).  What 
Levinas overlooks is the fact that ‘the Neighbour is the (evil) Thing which potentially 
lurks beneath every homely human face’ (2009: 16); Sartre, likewise, albeit in a different 
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context and milieu, in which it is scarcity, rather than alterity per se, that constitutes the 
radical negation of man, would argue, nevertheless, that the other is ‘an anti-human 
member of an alien species’ and the ‘principle of Evil’ (Sartre 2004: 149).  Still, what is 
evil if it is not precisely the horrifying appearance before the subject of something it 
considers abject?  Evil and alterity converge in the face where all apparent meaning has 
collapsed; nevertheless, as with Kant’s radical sublime, one should not confuse the 
source of evil with the evil attributed to the hated object.  Let us give that source a name: 
if it is not exactly one’s own body, with its excretions, plasticity, functional failings, and 
so on, it is something proximate to it; it is the ‘thing’/ das Ding that one is.  Is it not the 
case, then, that the subject, in an effort to evade the traumatic convulsion caused by 
encountering its own impersonal and uncanny ‘thingly’ presence, withdraws from its 
alienation by attributing an evil and monstrous density to a human other, even though, 
as we have said, the abjection is the subject’s own?  What this shows is that Levinasian 
ethical transcendence and the radical evil associated with states of abjection, which is to 
say, the failure to achieve such transcendence, remain two sides of the same human 
‘face’.   Both faces – the face that holds me hostage and the face from which I withdraw 
in abject disgust – derive, also, from the same crisis; both must be seen to be 
symptomatic of the same predicament that arises with the permanent revocation of the 
ethical today – in Zizek’s terms, from a kind of unending ‘politico-religious suspension of 
the ethical’ (Zizek 2009: 478) or what Agamben refers to as the permanent state of 
exception – in which what we confront is a world deprived of the guarantees afforded by 
the former safe havens (or consolations) of religion or transcendental philosophy. 
 
Final observation: how it ends. 
 
 
 
 
 
As the father slowly makes his departure from the stage, his absence is gradually 
replaced by an increasingly excruciating noise: a deafening, inhuman, soundscape – 
what appears to be the white noise of grating metal. It is as if the theatre machine itself 
were suddenly exposed in its infernal purpose – and, as if to confirm this: the image of 
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Christ’s face, peering at us from out of the gloom of what little light remains, appears to 
begin weeping.  Instead of tears, however, it is a putrid black effluence that seems to 
seep through the pours of the painting – slowly at first, but eventually forming a torrent, 
until nothing remains of the image - or the face, which is literally effaced…what one is 
left with is the ‘faceless’ anonymity of the stage.  What one might call, the Il y a… the 
bare fact of the ‘there is’ of the theatre (Levinas refers to the ‘Il y a’ as ‘existing without 
existents’, it is a ‘being without nothingness, which leaves no hole and permits no escape’ 
Levinas 1987: 50). 
If there is more at stake here than mere iconoclasm, it is because the destruction 
of the image on the stage brings us before the abject condition in which theatre’s own 
materiality is announced. Or rather, produced: and it is into this field of production, 
which is usually concealed from the audience, that the viewer is drawn, revealing a space 
of discrepancy, opened up between what the theatrical image promises, on the one hand 
– that which is meant to produce, through the machinery of the theatre, a complete 
meaning, that is to say, deliverance of the audience from the turbulence and disarray 
provoked by the disturbing ‘event’ of the theatre through to the relaxation induced by a 
catharsis – and, on the other hand, what those images fail to symbolise: the safe passage 
to a conciliated world, which is meant to demonstrate the spectator’s autonomy as much 
as the character’s salvation.  This discrepancy, in Castellucci’s work, would appear, 
thereby, to rent open the very frame of theatrical representation revealing its inherent 
instability.  It produces a hiatus in the symbolic function of the image, or of theatre’s 
capacity to produce an image capable of transcending its theatrical origin in order to 
attain that hallowed and sacred place where art and religion were once conjoined; and it 
points to the crisis – one is tempted to say, once again following Lyotard, the ‘disaster’ of 
theatre in so far as it makes this failure to complete the circuit of representation its 
object.   
What we are left with is the curious satisfaction that comes with displeasure: 
Castellucci’s is a theatre that refuses to console its audience with the theatricality of 
false icons, that is to say, with mere theatrical transcendence.  As such, it is a theatre 
that seems to relish in exploiting the tension that opens up the edge that runs between 
the abject and the sublime: the latter, the sublime, grounds the theatre in the failure of 
representation; the former, however, which returns us to the abjection of theatre’s 
questionable materiality, suggests that the theatre is also not so sublime: it is grounded 
in the failure of the achievement of transcendence.   
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1 Levinas writes: ‘behind the already plastic forms in which the face does no more than present 
itself, re-present itself and appear as an image, and where, in that image, the face reveals itself as 
some thing [there is revealed] the ancient, biblical call and command that awakens the subject to 
a responsibility for the other on the basis of an uprightness that is exposure to death’ (Levinas, 
1999: 130). 
